Assignment 7 β€” Game Theory & AHP

Three competitive games turned from sentences into payoff matrices and solved by the saddle-point test, and two AHP problems taken from a pairwise matrix to priority weights, a ranking and a consistency check.

PROBLEMS: 5 UNIT: UNIT 04 β€” GAMES Β· UNIT 07 β€” AHP Original: Assignment 7
β—† The method for every problem on this page
  1. Game β€” formulate: the row player is the firm whose "advantage" the payoff measures. Convert every sentence to that firm's gain: its gain +k, its loss βˆ’k, the rival's gain βˆ’k, the rival's loss +k, equal/random award 0.
  2. Game β€” solve: row minima β†’ maximin; column maxima β†’ minimax. Equal ⟹ saddle point, pure strategies, value V = that cell. Unequal ⟹ reduce by dominance, then the 2 Γ— 2 mixed-strategy formula.
  3. AHP: complete the matrix with reciprocals (if A vs B = k, B vs A = 1/k) β†’ add each column β†’ divide every entry by its column total β†’ average each row = priority weights (they add to 1) β†’ rank.
  4. Interpret in words: which strategy each firm should use and whether the game is fair (V = 0); which vendor/supplier is preferred and by how much.

Theory: Unit 4 Β· Theory of Games Β· Unit 7 Β· AHP.

β˜… Tricks that save time in the exam
  • Circle the row minima, box the column maxima β€” a value both circled and boxed is the saddle point. All three games here have one.
  • AHP sanity check: the row with the biggest numbers in the original matrix must get the biggest weight, and the weights must sum to 1.
  • Consistency (one optional line that impresses): CR = CI / RI with RI = 0.58 for three items; CR < 0.10 means the judgements are consistent.

Game Q1 β€” TBL Cargo vs ABL Cargo

Question

Each firm chooses a Low-tariff (L) or Premium-tariff (P) strategy; the payoff is ABL's expected profit advantage (β‚Ή lakh). Both low: ABL's payoff 1. ABL low, TBL premium: TBL's payoff is 6. ABL premium, TBL low: ABL's payoff 5. Both premium: ABL's payoff 2. Prepare the zero-sum payoff matrix.

Assignment 7 p. 1

Solution
  1. Step 1 β€” Row player = ABL (the payoff is ABL's advantage) ABL gains ⟹ +; TBL gains ⟹ βˆ’ for ABL "TBL's payoff is 6" ⟹ ABL's payoff βˆ’6
  2. Step 2 β€” Payoff matrix with the saddle-point test
    ABL ↓ / TBL β†’TBL Low (L)TBL Premium (P)Row min
    ABL Low (L)1βˆ’6βˆ’6
    ABL Premium (P)52 βŠ›2
    Column max52
  3. Step 3 β€” Interpret Maximin = 2 = Minimax = 2 ⟹ saddle point at (ABL P, TBL P) Value of the game V = 2 (β‚Ή2 lakh in ABL's favour)

    Both should quote the premium tariff. The game is not fair: ABL keeps a β‚Ή2 lakh advantage whatever TBL does, because ABL's premium row (5, 2) beats its low row (1, βˆ’6) in every column.


Game Q2 β€” Auto Ltd vs Moto Ltd β€” three pricing strategies

Question

Strategies H (high, written "A" in two sentences), M (moderate), P (premium). Payoff = Auto's profit advantage. H,H: Auto gains 4 Β· H,M: Moto loses 6 Β· H,P: Auto gains 5 Β· M,H: "moderate pricing loses 3" Β· M,M: both gain equally Β· M,P: "premium gains 1" Β· P,H: "premium gains 2" Β· P,M: "premium gains 4" Β· P,P: Auto gains 1.

Assignment 7 p. 1

Solution
  1. Step 1 β€” Decode each sentence to Auto's payoff (Auto is the first-named, row player)
    (Auto, Moto)SentenceAuto's payoff
    H, HAuto gains 4+4
    H, MMoto loses 6 ⟹ Auto gains 6+6
    H, PAuto gains 5+5
    M, Hthe one playing moderate (Auto) loses 3βˆ’3
    M, Mequal gains ⟹ no advantage0
    M, Pthe one playing premium (Moto) gains 1βˆ’1
    P, Hthe one playing premium (Auto) gains 2+2
    P, Mthe one playing premium (Auto) gains 4+4
    P, PAuto gains 1+1

    The wording is loose ("A" for high, "premium gains") β€” state your reading in one line, as here, before the matrix.

  2. Step 2 β€” Payoff matrix
    Auto ↓ / Moto β†’Moto HMoto MMoto PRow min
    Auto H4 βŠ›654
    Auto Mβˆ’30βˆ’1βˆ’3
    Auto P2411
    Column max465
  3. Step 3 β€” Interpret Maximin = 4 = Minimax = 4 ⟹ saddle point at (H, H) V = 4: Auto keeps a β‚Ή4 lakh advantage

    Both firms should choose high pricing. Auto's H row dominates its other rows outright, and against Auto's H, Moto loses least by also pricing high.


Game Q3 β€” Solar Ltd vs Green Ltd β€” bidding tariffs

Question

Payoff = Green's advantage over Solar. Green L: loses 3, 7, 6 against Solar's L, M, H. Green M: gains 2, 5, 4. Green H: gains 1, 3, 4.

Assignment 7 p. 1

Solution
  1. Step 1 β€” Row player = Green; losses are negative Green L row: βˆ’3, βˆ’7, βˆ’6 Green M row: 2, 5, 4 Green H row: 1, 3, 4
  2. Step 2 β€” Payoff matrix
    Green ↓ / Solar β†’Solar LSolar MSolar HRow min
    Green Lβˆ’3βˆ’7βˆ’6βˆ’7
    Green M2 βŠ›542
    Green H1341
    Column max254
  3. Step 3 β€” Interpret Maximin = 2 = Minimax = 2 ⟹ saddle point at (Green M, Solar L) V = 2 in Green's favour

    Green should bid a moderate tariff; Solar's best reply is a low tariff, holding Green's advantage to β‚Ή2 lakh. Dominance agrees: Green's M row beats its L row everywhere, and Solar's L column is smaller than its M and H columns everywhere.


AHP problems

Both use your lecture's method β€” normalise each column, average each row Lecture p. 25 β€” the same method as the 2025-26 answer keys.


AHP Q1 β€” Choosing a software vendor

Question
Vendor AVendor BVendor C
Vendor A11/35
Vendor B17
Vendor C1

(1) How does Vendor B compare with A and C? (2) Using AHP priorities, which vendor is most and which least preferred?

Assignment 7 p. 1

Solution
  1. Step 1 β€” Complete with reciprocals, add the columns
    Vendor AVendor BVendor C
    Vendor A11/3 = 0.3335
    Vendor B317
    Vendor C1/5 = 0.21/7 = 0.1431
    Column total4.21.47613

    A vs B = 1/3 means B vs A = 3; A vs C = 5 ⟹ C vs A = 1/5; B vs C = 7 ⟹ C vs B = 1/7.

  2. Step 2 β€” Normalise and average each row
    Vendor AVendor BVendor CPriority
    Vendor A0.2380.2260.3850.283
    Vendor B0.7140.6770.5380.643
    Vendor C0.0480.0970.0770.074
    Check: 0.283 + 0.643 + 0.074 = 1.000 βœ“
  3. (1) Vendor B against the others

    B vs A = 3 β€” B is moderately more competitive than A. B vs C = 7 β€” B is very strongly more competitive than C.

  4. (2) Recommendation Vendor B most recommended (0.643), then A (0.283); Vendor C least preferred (0.074)

    Consistency: Ξ»max = 3.066, CI = 0.033, CR = 0.056 < 0.10 β€” the CIO's judgements are consistent.


AHP Q2 β€” Solar equipment suppliers β€” quality and reliability

Question
A1A2A3
A111/34
A216
A31

(a) Complete the matrix using the reciprocal property. (b) Calculate the priority weights. (c) Rank the suppliers. (d) Interpret the Plant Head's judgement and recommend a supplier.

Assignment 7 p. 2

Solution
  1. (a) Completed matrix
    A1 AlphaA2 BetaA3 Gamma
    A1 Alpha11/3 = 0.3334
    A2 Beta316
    A3 Gamma1/4 = 0.251/6 = 0.1671
    Column total4.251.511
  2. (b) Priority weights
    A1 AlphaA2 BetaA3 GammaPriority
    A1 Alpha0.2350.2220.3640.274
    A2 Beta0.7060.6670.5450.639
    A3 Gamma0.0590.1110.0910.087
    Check: 0.274 + 0.639 + 0.087 = 1.000 βœ“
  3. (c) Ranking A2 Beta (0.639) > A1 Alpha (0.274) > A3 Gamma (0.087)
  4. (d) Interpretation

    The Plant Head rates Beta moderately better than Alpha (3) and strongly-to-very-strongly better than Gamma (6), and Alpha moderately-to-strongly better than Gamma (4). Beta carries almost two-thirds of the total weight, so Supplier Beta (A2) is recommended for equipment quality and reliability. CR = 0.047 < 0.10, so the judgements are consistent.